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Abstract 
Does brownfield redevelopment warrant government support? We explore several external 
benefits in an urban general equilibrium framework. Preferences are modelled such that 
demand for housing units in the city is downward sloping, which yields a more general setup 
than the extreme open and closed city cases. We shed light on the relative importance of 
general equilibrium effects of nonmarginal redevelopment projects and we isolate the 
external benefits of the removal of a local nuisance, the exploitation of agglomeration 
economies and the preservation of open space at the urban fringe. A numerical application 
indicates that local nuisance and agglomeration effects may push social returns significantly 
beyond the value of redeveloped land that accrues to its owner. However, depending on the 
price elasticity of urban housing demand and the strength of agglomeration economies, the 
amount of preserved greenfield land may be small and it only generates additional benefits to 
the extent that direct land use policies fail to internalize its value as open space. 
 
JEL Classifications: R13, R21, R52 
Keywords: brownfield redevelopment, land use externalities, urban general equilibrium, 
benefit-cost analysis 
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1 Introduction 
 
Government involvement in the regeneration of outdated or derelict industrial sites in 
centrally located urban areas is widespread. In the US, for instance, several federal and state 
level programs support the remediation of hazardous waste sites. Total expenditure on the 
largest of them, the so-called Superfund program, amounted to approximately $35 billion in 
2005.1 Moreover, land use policies tend to favour densification in existing urban areas over 
the development of greenfield sites at their fringe, particularly in Europe. The Dutch 
government aims to realize 40% of new housing supply in existing urban areas and a planning 
target set by the UK government even states that 60% of new housing should be provided on 
previously developed land and through the conversion of existing buildings.2 The US Smart 
Growth Network similarly advocates densification through the restoration of centre cities and 
older suburbs.3 The transformation of outdated industrial or brownfield sites is an obvious 
channel through which such targets can be met.  
 The presence and magnitude of external benefits is a key issue for the evaluation of 
government support for brownfield redevelopment. The owner of a brownfield site will weigh 
the value of real estate after redevelopment against investment costs. However, if this site 
imposes negative local externalities in its current use, then surrounding residents will benefit 
from the project as well. Besides the health risks that are associated with soil contamination, 
one may think of noxious emissions, noise or unpleasant odours from industrial activity, or 
the vandalism and illegal dumping that derelict sites attract. Because of these externalities, a 
redevelopment project may be socially desirable even if investment costs outweigh the real 
estate value, so that government support is warranted.  
 This paper explores the evaluation of external benefits of brownfield redevelopment in 
a tractable urban general equilibrium framework. It aims to shed light on various important 
methodological issues, as identified in a recent handbook on Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) of 
land cleanup and reuse from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2011). In the 
first place, we investigate the relative importance of general equilibrium effects. It is common 
to evaluate external benefits through capitalization in the value of proximate real estate, as 
under certain conditions, a hedonic model identifies the marginal willingness to pay for the 
removal of a local pollutant or nuisance. Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) provide an 
                                                 
1
 See Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) and EPA (2011).  
2
 See VROM et al. (2004) and CLG (2010) for policy statements in the Dutch and UK cases respectively.  
3
 See http://www.smartgrowth.org/.  
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insightful discussion and a particularly thorough application to the Superfund cleanups.4 
However, a redevelopment project of nonmarginal size will affect land value throughout an 
urban area, so that a hedonic partial equilibrium framework overestimates its benefits. Our 
analysis relates the magnitude of this bias to the size of the project and to housing demand 
conditions at the level of the urban area.  
 A considerable body of empirical evidence supports the existence of a positive 
relationship between urban density and productivity.5 For instance, Greenstone et al. (2010) 
find that existing plant productivity improves after the entry of a new large plant, so that the 
redevelopment of urban space adjacent to other firms may further the exploitation of 
agglomeration benefits. An increase in population density may generate agglomeration 
economies by sharing fixed costs of infrastructure or other local public goods.6 Hence, 
through its impact on density, brownfield redevelopment should be expected to generate 
additional external benefits. We incorporate agglomeration externalities into our general 
equilibrium framework and isolate the additional benefits that accrue through this channel. 
 A third issue is the external benefit of greenfield preservation. The ‘brownfield / 
greenfield offset’ is commonly derived on the basis of residential densities, which are higher 
in centrally located redeveloped brownfields than on greenfield land at the urban fringe7, yet 
this overlooks housing demand conditions at the urban level. We show that the offset vanishes 
if demand is sufficiently elastic and that brownfield redevelopment may even induce the 
conversion of additional greenfield land in the presence of agglomeration economies. The 
external benefit of greenfields preservation depends on the extent to which the (shadow) price 
of open space misrepresents its social value.8 However this external value may have been 
internalized by land use constraints at the urban fringe already, so that brownfield 
redevelopment does not yield additional benefits. This often-overlooked point seems of 
particular relevance in a European context, where compact urban development is a ubiquitous 
feature of land use planning. Nevertheless, when the implementation of first-best policies at 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Michaels and Smith (1990), Kohlhase (1991), Gayer et al. (2000), Kiel and Zabel (2001), McCluskey 
and Rausser (2003), Ihlanfeldt and Taylor (2004) and Kaufman and Cloutier (2006) for earlier applications of 
hedonic pricing to the valuation of hazardous waste site or brownfield externalities. A review and in-depth 
methodological discussion is provided in EPA (2011) and Smith (2011). 
5
 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey. 
6
 Duranton and Puga (2004) provide an overview of micro-economic foundations for agglomeration economies.  
7
 See for instance Deason et al. (2001) or De Sousa (2002).  
8
 The notion that greenfields near the urban fringe represent a nonmarket value as open space is supported in 
several empirical studies, see McConnell and Walls (2005) for a survey. 
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the urban fringe is hindered for institutional or other reasons9, preserved greenfields may 
contribute to the external benefits of brownfield redevelopment. 
 Housing demand conditions at the urban level play a key role in the evaluation of 
these external benefits. The urban economics literature distinguishes two standard, yet 
extreme cases: the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’ city. The total number of households in a closed 
city is fixed, so aggregate demand for housing units is perfectly price-inelastic. Furthermore, 
the density gradient determines the brownfield / greenfield offset in this case, since 
brownfield redevelopment does not attract any additional residents to the city. Agglomeration 
economies in the total urban population are irrelevant.10 In an open city, households can freely 
migrate to or from perfect substitutes that fix a reservation utility level. Hence, demand for 
housing units is perfectly elastic: households bid prices up to the level where they enjoy 
exactly the same utility as outside of this city. In the absence of agglomeration externalities, 
the general equilibrium effects of brownfield redevelopment will coincide with the partial 
equilibrium effects that are identified in a hedonic framework. The reason is that even a 
nonmarginal project becomes marginal if the relevant market also includes the perfect 
substitute places that fix utility. Brownfield redevelopment does not affect greenfield 
conversion under these assumptions, because the perfectly elastic demand dictates prices at 
the urban fringe, irrespective of urban land supply in the city centre.  
 We model household preferences in such a way that demand for housing units in the 
city becomes downward sloping. Following Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2010), we introduce 
heterogeneity in the taste for some unique attribute of the city under consideration.11 One may 
think of a specific amenity or of idiosyncratic attachment through personal history or social 
networks. The city is populated by the households that have the strongest taste for its attribute. 
As housing supply expands through brownfield redevelopment, new households enter with an 
ever lower taste. This depresses prices and introduces the negative general equilibrium effect 
in the welfare analysis. The elasticity of demand for housing units is decreasing in the 
                                                 
9
 For instance, impact fees in the US typically must satisfy a ‘rational nexus’ test that ties them to the costs of 
providing facilities (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). Direct regulation of the use of greenfield land may be 
similarly hindered by protection of the property rights of its owners. 
10
 Smith (2011), which collects peer review reports for an earlier draft of EPA (2011), contains a particularly 
insightful illustration of the welfare effects of brownfield redevelopment in the closed city case by Jan 
Brueckner. Similarly, Quigley and Swoboda (2007) and Walsh (2007) use a closed city framework to show that 
local provision of open space may be ineffective because it spurs the conversion of agricultural land at other 
sites. The new supply that is generated through inner city redevelopment reduces development elsewhere 
through the same underlying mechanism. 
11
 This approach is based on discrete choice theory of product differentiation (Anderson et al., 1992). The 
relevance of heterogeneous preferences for location has been well acknowledged in the urban economics 
literature, see Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) for an early reference. 
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variation in idiosyncratic tastes, encompassing the open and the closed city as limiting cases.
 The next section sets out the general equilibrium framework and derives analytical 
expressions for the internal and external benefits of redeveloping a brownfield site. An 
empirical application illustrates the key mechanisms in our model and it provides a crude 
sense of their quantitative significance. We calibrate our model to a redevelopment project in 
the medium-sized town of Nijmegen in the Netherlands, which proposed moving an industrial 
site from its centre to the outer fringe, partly to get rid of unpleasant odours from a producer 
of tomato ketchup and a large abattoir, and replacing it with residential real estate. The project 
proposal was part of a recent series of applications for grants of the Dutch government to 
support urban redevelopment projects. In several of these applications, the external benefits 
that this paper considers featured prominently.12  
 
 
2 Analytical framework 
 
We consider a circular city in which a sector ω is available for urban use. All jobs are located 
in a dimensionless Central Business District (CBD). The industrial site or brownfield 
surrounds this CBD up to a distance ra.13 Households live in the area that ranges from ra to the 
urban fringe rb, which will be endogenized in an extension of the model. The opportunity cost 
of urban land use is foregone agricultural production and open space. Production in the CBD 
exhibits external increasing returns to scale F(N), where N denotes the number of households 
or jobs in the city, while the industrial land yields some constant return P that may equal zero 
in the case of a derelict brownfield site. Industrial land reduces the environmental quality E(r) 
in its vicinity through noxious emissions, unpleasant odours or some other type of negative 
externality.14 The project involves conversion of the site into a residential area, which 
eradicates the reduction in environmental quality.15 Structures and plot sizes in the existing 
city will not be adjusted because of durability.16 
                                                 
12
 CPB and PBL (2010) provides an overview. 
13
 Chapter 5 of EPA (2011) considers a setup in which the brownfield is situated inbetween the centre and the 
urban fringe. 
14
 This setup closely follows the ‘externality model of residential choice’ in Fujita (1989). 
15
 To fix ideas, we assume that industrial production on the brownfield is terminated. The setup is easily adapted 
to the case in which firms are relocated to an industrial site outside of the the city.  
16
 While this simplifying assumption is realistic in the short run, changes in land prices should affect densities 
throughout the city in the long run. The implications for welfare are limited in our analysis, because lot sizes are 
chosen optimally prior to redevelopment of the brownfield. Hence, it follows from the envelope theorem that 
benefits of subsequently adjusting them are of second-order importance for small projects. Alternatively, we 
could have assumed that plot sizes are fixed and independent of location, but this seems less realistic than the 
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2.1 Equilibrium on urban housing and labour markets 
 
The city has some unique feature and households vary in their appreciation for it. Following 
the setup of Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2010), we enter the taste for residing in the city as a 
random component into the household utility function. More formally, the city is part of a 
country inhabited by a continuum I of households indexed by i. Utility is additively separable 
into a common component v and the random component that is specific to each household i, 
giving: 
( ) ( )u i v iε= + .          (1) 
Random components are drawn from a common distribution with cumulative density function 
F(ε). The ordering of households on I is such that ( )iε  is a monotonously decreasing 
function. The households with the highest draw sort into our city and since this draw does not 
depend on their location within the city, they should all receive the same common utility 
level.17 We assume the rest of the country to be large, so that the reservation utility u that 
households can attain elsewhere is exogenous. For the marginal household in the city i  it 
must hold that ( )u i u=  and hence ( )i u vε = − . We thus obtain the number of households 
that choose to live in the city as: 
( ) ( )1DN v I F u v= − −   .         (2) 
This equation may be interpreted as a demand equation for housing in the city: more 
households will be attracted when a higher common utility level is on offer. If the variation in 
the random or idiosyncratic component is large, then only a small number of additional 
households will be drawn into the city, so that it behaves much like a closed city. Limited 
variation in the idiosyncratic component implies that a small increase in the common utility 
level will attract a large number of new households, as in the open city case.  
Apart from their idiosyncratic taste for living in the city, households are homogeneous 
and they derive utility from the size of the plot of land s on which they live and from the 
consumption of a composite commodity z. Proximity to the industrial site reduces their 
wellbeing because it reduces the environmental quality. The common utility function is 
written as ( )( ), ,U s z E r  and in a spatial equilibrium, it should equal v. This condition may be 
                                                                                                                                                        
assumption that they were chosen optimally, as density generally declines with distance from the city centre (see 
e.g. Arnott et al., 1999). 
17
 Suppose, on the contrary, that common utility were higher in one particular location. Irrespective of the 
random draw they had received, households from the rest of the city would move to this place until higher land 
prices had undone the common utility differential.  
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inverted in order to obtain ( )( ), ,Z s E r v , the amount of z a household in the city requires in 
order to obtain v given s and E(r).  
 Households provide one unit of labour for which they receive a wage w. Commuting 
costs are given by tr, where t is the transport cost per unit of distance. The bid rent or 
maximum rent a household can afford to pay per unit of land is then given by: 
( ) ( )( ), ,, , max
s
w tr Z v s E r
r w v
s
ψ
− −
= ,       (3) 
where the price of z is normalized to one. In a spatial equilibrium, rents should be equal to bid 
rents. The first-order condition associated with (3) reads 
( )( ) ( )( ), , , ,w trZ v s
s s
E r Z v s E r∂ − −
− =
∂
.       (4) 
This expression states the usual condition that the marginal rate of substituting the composite 
commodity for land should equal their rate of exchange at market prices. The lot size function 
( ), ,s r w v  that satisfies this condition solves the consumer problem.18 We assume that the size 
of structures and plots in the existing city is not affected by the project, which means that 
condition (4) is not satisfied. In that case, bid rents are obtained by substituting an exogenous 
lot size function into (3).  
 Each plot will be used for the construction of one house that will accommodate one 
household. Urban housing supply is thus obtained by integrating plot density over the entire 
residential area, which will be denoted by L:  
( ) ( )
1
,
, ,
S
L
N w v
s r w v
= ∫ .         (5) 
At a given wage w, a higher common utility level is realized by increasing the size of plots, 
which results in a lower density and less housing supply. The equilibrium number of 
households ( )*N w  and common utility level ( )*v w  are obtained by equating this supply to 
housing demand from expression (2). This market clearing process is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which plots the demand and supply for housing in the city as a function of the common utility 
level.19 
                                                 
18
 Households and small developers throughout the urban area would not take external agglomeration benefits 
into account in their choice of lot size. Hence, we do not consider densification as a second-best land use 
planning instrument in order to enhance the exploitation of agglomeration benefits.  
19
 All figures in this paper are based on simulations with the base scenario of our calibrated model.  
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 Since each household provides one unit of labour, the equilibrium number of 
households ( )*N w  may also be interpreted as a labour supply equation. In the CBD, labour is 
the single input in the production of a good that is traded on international markets for a price 
normalized to unity, employing a production technology of the shape ( ) ( )NNgNF = , where 
( )g N  may be thought of as an increasing concave function of the urban employment level. 
The marginal product of labour is ( ) ( )NNgNg '+ , but individual firms ignore the impact of 
wage setting on N, so that they pay labour its average product ( )Ng . Hence, the labour 
market is in equilibrium when wages are set at such a level that  
( )( )*w g N w= .           (6) 
In addition, there is a stability condition: the cost of attracting an additional household must 
exceed its average product. We assume that there is a unique stable equilibrium on the urban 
labour market and we denote the equilibrium wage and number of households by w* and N* 
respectively. Figure 2 illustrates labour demand and supply curves in our calibrated model. 
There are two intersections and only the second one is stable.  
 
2.2 Welfare analysis 
 
It is a standard result in urban economic theory that social surplus, defined as the difference 
between the value of the urban produce and all costs that have to be made in order to ensure a 
common utility level, equals the total differential land rent in an open city (see e.g. Fujita, 
1989).20 Hence, the welfare effects of converting a industrial site into a residential area are 
given by the investment costs Q that are associated with cleaning or decontamination and 
conversion and the induced change in the total differential land rent. We refer to the total land 
value in urban use net of its value in agriculture and open space as the developer surplus, 
since it equals the profit of an urban developer who buys land from farmers, compensates 
society for the loss of open space and then rents it out to households and firms.  
 In our general equilibrium framework, the heterogeneity of preferences over a unique 
attribute of the city gives rise to an additional welfare effect, which is the induced change in 
inframarginal utility. Figure 3 plots ( )u i u− , the difference between the utility level that is 
reached by household i and the reservation utility level, against the household index i. 
                                                 
20
 It is common to evaluate surplus under the side condition that utility is equalized over space. The allocation 
that maximizes a Benthamite social welfare function cannot be supported by a competitive equilibrium, since it 
involves the ‘unequal treatment of equals’. 
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Brownfield redevelopment raises housing supply, so the common utility level must rise in 
order to attract new households. This implies that all households in the city will be made 
better off, except the last or marginal household, which cannot attain more than the 
reservation utility level in equilibrium. The change in the area under ( )u i u−  thus reflects a 
change in consumer surplus. 
 Let v0, w0 and N0 denote the equilibrium common utility level, wage and 
corresponding number of households prior to the project respectively. These are obtained by 
substituting the residential area that ranges from ra to rb for L in equation (5) and then solving 
it simultaneously with equations (2) and (6). Furthermore, let C denote the annualized21 
private opportunity costs, consisting of conversion costs and the value of land in agricultural 
use, and assume that the annualized external value of agricultural land as open space equals 
V.22 Prior to the redevelopment project, the developer surplus then reads: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 00 0
0 0
0 , ,
a b b
a
r r r
r
S F N PL r dr tr r n r dr C V L r drZ v s E r= + − + − +∫ ∫ ∫ , (7) 
where ( ) ( )00 0, ,s rs wr v≡ , ( ) 2L r rpiω≡ , ( ) ( ) ( )0 0n r L r s r≡  and ( )0E r  reflects hazard or 
nuisances caused by the brownfield site. The first two terms in this expression represent the 
value of the produce in the CBD and on the industrial site. The third term reflects commuting 
costs and the expenditure on the composite commodity that is required in order to ensure a 
common utility level of v0 for all households. Opportunity costs of the urban land are included 
through the final term. We may rewrite this surplus as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0
0
0
a b
a
r r
r
S C V L rP dr C V L r drrψ= + +− −     + ∫ ∫ ,    (8) 
where ( ) ( )00 0, ,r w vr ψψ ≡ .23 Hence it is seen to equal the total differential land rent, defined 
here as the difference between land rents and the sum of opportunity costs.  
 The project changes L in equation (5), the residential area now ranges from the CBD 
to rb, and it establishes a new environmental quality ( )1E r . Lot sizes in the existing urban 
area remain equal to ( )0s r  because of durability of structures, but density in the redeveloped 
                                                 
21
 We convert all costs and benefits to annual values in order to make them comparable. Even if conversion is a 
one time cost in reality, it may be thought of as being paid through debt that has to be serviced annually. The 
present value of service payments would then equal the one time conversion costs. 
22
 Open space is not included explicitly in the utility function in order to keep the analysis tractable. The external 
value of open space V may be justified by a nonuse or existence value that wider society attaches to the stock of 
open space. McConnell and Walls (2005) survey the literature on use and nonuse values values of open space.  
23
 This is seen by using the fact that F(N0) equals w0 integrated over household density throughout the city, since 
workers get paid their average product in equilibrium, and by substituting in the definition of n0(r). 
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area is endogenous. Otherwise, equilibrium on urban housing and labour markets is 
determined in the same way, yielding v1, w1 and N1. Developer surplus in this new 
equilibrium is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 11 1 1 1
1 1
0
0 0
0
          
, ,
, , .
a
b b
a
r
r r
r
S F N tr r n r dr
tr r
Z v s E r
Z v s n r dr C V LE r r dr
= − +
− + − +
∫
∫ ∫
    (9) 
This expression may again be written as a total differential land rent: 
( ) ( ) ( )11
0
br
S r C V L r drψ −  = +∫ ,         (10) 
where bid rents in the existing area are obtained by substitution of ( )0s r  into expression (3). 
The change in developer surplus thus equals: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
1 0
0
1
a a b
a
r r r
r
S L r dr PL r dr L r dr r rrψ ψ ψ∆ = − + −  ∫ ∫ ∫ .    (11) 
 The first term of expression (11) represents the benefits of the project that capitalize 
into the price of the redeveloped land. These will be taken into account by a profit-
maximizing owner, so we will refer to them as the internal benefits. The second term 
represents the opportunity cost of the redeveloped land and together with the investment 
costs, it represents the internal costs of the project. The third term represents welfare effects 
that are not internalized into the price of the redeveloped land. They may be decomposed as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 01 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0
0
0 0 10 0          
, , , ,
, , , .,
b b
a a
b
a
r r
r r
r
r
r r Z v s E r Z v s E r n
Z v E r Z v
L r dr r r r dr
N w s r s r r drE r n
ψ ψ  − −    
 
−
=
+ ∆ −
∫ ∫
∫
 (12) 
The first term in expression (12) represents the external benefit of removing a hazard or 
nuisance for surrounding residents. The new households raise productivity of households who 
were already in the city, which gives rise to the second term. The third term reflects the 
increase in expenditure on the composite commodity that is required in order to assure the rise 
in the common utility level. In order to attract new households to the city, the common utility 
level must rise and given the fixed lot sizes and environmental quality, this can only occur 
through an increase in consumption of other goods, which must be granted through a discount 
on land prices. Note that this increase may vary with distance to the CBD. 
 10 
 In order to obtain the total benefits from the project, we have to augment the change in 
developer surplus as expressed in (11) with a monetary measure for the rise in consumer 
surplus. Three groups of households may be distinguished. Households with a taste 1ε ε< , 
where 1 1u vε ≡ − , do not enter the city after the project, so they are indifferent. Households 
with a taste 0ε ε≥  were already in the city prior to the project, so they all experience the same 
rise in common utility level. As we have just seen, this rise materializes through increased 
consumption of the composite commodity. Hence, the third term of expression (12) 
constitutes a transfer from landowners to consumers and not an additional benefit.24 The final 
group with tastes ( ]0 1,ε ε ε∈  consists of new households in the city. The marginal household 
with taste 1ε  is again indifferent, but there are inframarginal new households who are made 
better off by the project. In order to measure the inframarginal surplus, we compare 
( ) ( )( )01 1, ,s rZ v E r , the consumption of composite commodities at distance r required to 
sustain the utility distribution in the new equilibrium, to ( ) ( )( )0 1, ,Z su r E rε− , which is the 
amount that would be required for a household with taste ε to sustain the (lower) reservation 
utility level. Assuming that all new households would locate at a distance r from the CBD, a 
money metric for the utility gain of this group would be 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1
0
0 01 1 1, , , ,Z v E r Z u E rM r I s r s r f d
ε
ε
ε ε ε =  − −∫ ,   (13) 
where f(ε) is the density function that corresponds to the distribution of tastes and I is the 
number of households in the country. An unattractive but unavoidable treat of this metric is 
that it depends on location, which is a consequence of the fundamental property that the 
marginal utility of income varies with distance to the CBD (Wildasin, 1986). In our 
calibration, we arbitrarily evaluate (13) at the average commuting distance rˆ  within the newly 
developed area. It has been verified using our calibrated model that this choice is of little 
consequence.  
Table 1 summarizes the benefits and costs of the redevelopment project. In this table, 
the benefits of removing a hazard or nuisance and increased scale have been classified as 
external, together with the inframarginal surplus. The owner of the redeveloped land would 
not take these benefits into account, so they may justify government intervention. Hence, the 
magnitude of these benefits relative to the value of the redeveloped land is an important 
outcome in the policy debate on brownfield redevelopment. The fact that this project 
                                                 
24
 For an owner-occupier, this gain in consumer surplus would be exactly offset by the loss in asset value. 
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depresses land rents in the rest of the city along the housing demand curve is inconsequential 
for the BCA.  
 
2.3 Preservation of open space at the urban fringe 
 
Suppose that the redevelopment project will be finalized in some future year in which demand 
for housing in the city will be higher than it is now. The increase in demand is likely to bring 
forth new development at the urban fringe, some of which may be prevented by the project. In 
this sense the project preserves a certain amount of open space, which may yield additional 
welfare. The effect is incorporated into the model by endogenizing the urban fringe. We 
assume that in order to internalize the value of open space, the local government levies a tax 
on development τ, which is independent of whether or not the project takes place. Hence, rb is 
determined by the condition that:  
( ), ,b w v Crψ τ= + .          (14) 
We denote 0
b
r  the urban fringe in the situation in which the industrial site is not converted and 
1
b
r  the urban fringe if the project is executed. For the project to preserve open space, we must 
have 1 0
b b
r r< , although the reverse may also occur if housing demand is sufficiently elastic 
and if scale economies are sufficiently strong.  
 The change in developer surplus is now given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
1
1 1 0
1
0 0
          .
ba a
a
b
b
rr r
r
r
r
S L r dr PL r dr L r dr
C V L
r
r dr
r r
r
ψ ψ ψ
ψ
∆ = − +
+ +
−  
−  
∫ ∫ ∫
∫
    (15) 
The final term in this expression is additional to the welfare effects in expression (11) and it 
represents the value of the preserved open space. If the project is executed, then ( )1 rψ  must 
be smaller than C τ+  beyond 1
b
r , so we have:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
1 1
1
b b
b b
r r
r r
C V L r dr V L r dr rτψ− +  > −∫ ∫ .      (16) 
The right-hand side of this expression is the gap between the value of open space and the 
development tax, multiplied by the surface of the preserved area. It should approximate the 
left-hand side well if ( )1 rψ  is not too steep. Hence, if the government is able to internalize 
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the value of open space through direct planning policies, there is little additional benefit in 
supporting brownfield conversion. However, legal constraints that are based on the protection 
of property rights may render it difficult to effectively internalize the value of open space at 
the urban fringe. In that case, the additional benefit of open space preservation may be more 
substantial.  
 Expressions for the other welfare effects, as summarized in Table 1, remain 
unchanged, provided that the appropriate v1 and w1 are substituted. If 1 0
b b
r r< , then the number 
of new households will be smaller than in the case of an exogenous urban fringe. Hence, the 
agglomeration benefit, the transfer and the inframarginal surplus will be smaller as well, but 
the internal benefits will be larger. Costs of the project and the external benefit of removing 
the nuisance are unaffected.  
 
 
3 Numerical application 
 
3.1 Calibration of the model 
 
The analysis is applied to the conversion of a brownfield of about 100 hectares, which 
corresponds to 5% of the total amount of residential land available in the Dutch town of 
Nijmegen.25 This hypothetical project is chosen to be significantly larger than the industrial 
site that was considered in the ‘Nijmegen Waalfront’ project, so that we get a clearer view on 
the implications of transforming a nonmarginally large site when demand is downward 
sloping. Other urban parameters, such as the share of land developed, the surface of the 
residential area and the number of households, roughly correspond to statistics for Nijmegen. 
Table 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the parameters used in subsequent simulations. 
Common utility is assumed to be a product of environmental quality and a CES 
component in land and the composite commodity. This yields the indirect utility function: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )1 11, ,v R r Y tr E r E r Y tr R r σσσ σα β −−− = − + ,    (17) 
where 1α β+ = , ( )R r  denotes the land rent at distance r from the CBD and the price of the 
composite good has been normalized to one. The elasticity of substitution σ is chosen at 0.5, 
                                                 
25
 EPA (2011) reports an average size for brownfield sites of 3.5 hectare, whereas the average superfund site has 
a size of 890.8 hectare, so the brownfield area in our application is roughly in the middle. Table 3 also shows 
results for projects that are either smaller or larger by a factor four.  
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so households are less willing to substitute away from land than in the Cobb-Douglass case 
and land rents have a stronger impact on wellbeing.26  
 We assume that the tax on conversion of agricultural land is equal to an external value 
of 5 euro and that conversion costs an additional 4 euro annually, which is roughly in line 
with the numbers reported in Vermeulen (2011). Hence, if we evaluate expression (17) at the 
urban fringe, we can substitute ( )R r  from the boundary condition (14). The average 
household income Y is observed and we make empirically founded assumptions on t (also 
based on Vermeulen, 2011) and the shape of ( )E r , on which more details are provided 
below. By substitution, we obtain an equilibrium common utility level v for each assumption 
on the taste parameters. The condition that this v must be the same throughout the city 
implicitly defines land rents, while lot sizes follow from the corresponding compensated 
demand equation. Substitution into the urban housing supply equation (5), prior to the 
execution of the project, yields the number of households in the city and α and β are chosen 
such that this corresponds to the number we observe. This condition simultaneously 
determines the equilibrium common utility level v0. 
 Tastes are Pareto distributed according to the cumulative density function: 
( ) 1 1F γε ε= − ,          (18) 
which yields the demand equation: 
( ) ( )DN v I u v γ= − .          (19) 
The parameter u is set such that ( )0 80,000DN v =  with I = 7 million − the number of 
households in the Netherlands. The parameter γ is calibrated on the price elasticity of urban 
housing demand, which is defined as: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )0
, ,
D
D D
N v R r Y tr E rR r
N v R r
ε
∂ −
≡
∂
,      (20) 
where r  is the distance of the average household to the CBD. In the baseline, we choose γ 
such that this elasticity equals -2.27  
                                                 
26
 This parameter is taken from Vermeulen (2011), where a comparison of predicted to actual residential land use 
across cities provided a crude check on the calibration. Table 6 contains a sensitivity check with regard to the 
elasticity of substitution.  
27
 This elasticity refers to the price responsiveness of the number of units demanded in a specific city. We are not 
aware of any estimates in the literature, which usually considers the elasticity of housing services demanded with 
respect to prices (see e.g. Ermisch et al., 1996). A sensitivity analysis is reported in Table 4.  
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 We consider two specifications of ( )E r  that are based on alternative empirical studies 
of the impact of proximity to industrial sites on house prices in the Netherlands. First, 
following De Vor and De Groot (2011), we model the impact of an industrial site at distance d 
as: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 3
2 3
log
1 0 750 1 4log
1log log 1
1
a
a
r r
d r r
eR r R r
e
η η
η ηη ηρ
+ −
< + −
 
− = +  + 
,    (21) 
where R0 and R1 denote land rents with and without the presence of the site respectively. We 
use their estimates for the province of Brabant nearby Nijmegen for η1 to η3, while η4 and the 
dummy 7501d <  ensure that the effect levels off continuously after 750 meters. These estimates 
of the nuisance effect are conservative compared to other results in their paper. Setting 
( )1 1E r = , the function ( )0E r  can be solved analytically by substituting land rents into 
expression (21). Finally, De Vor and De Groot estimate a house price equation and we model 
the impact on land rents. The share of house prices that is spent on land ρ is roughly equal to 
25% in the centre of Nijmegen. The factor 1 ρ  on the right-hand side of expression (21) 
reflects the assumption that the entire effect of the nuisance on house prices operates through 
land rents.  
 Our second specification of ( )E r  is based on Rouwendal and Van der Straaten 
(2008), who estimate the impact of proximity to industrial sites as: 
( )( ) ( )( )1 0log logR r R r δθ ρ− = ,        (22) 
where θ is the percentage of land in industrial use in a circle with a radius of 500 meter 
surrounding the house. We use 0.006δ = , which corresponds to the estimate for Rotterdam, 
where Rouwendal and Van der Straaten found the strongest effect. Expression (22) assumes 
that houses are surrounded by either residential or industrial land, i.e. the nonurban land (of 
which there is a share 1 - ω) is located further away than the 500 meter radius. This leads to 
an overestimation of the impact of the nuisance. The function ( )0E r  is obtained from (22) in 
a similar way as before. Both variants are plotted in Figure 4.  
 The urban production function is given by: 
( )N KN NκΠ = ,          (23) 
where κ is the elasticity of average labour productivity with respect to urban scale – the 
number of households or jobs in the city. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the early 
literature on this elasticity as indicating that doubling city size raises productivity by an 
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amount that ranges from roughly 3 to 8%. However, these studies did not control for 
unobserved factors, such as the composition of the local workforce, that recent work has 
shown to result in downward bias (see in particular Combes et al., 2008). Therefore, we 
somewhat conservatively choose κ = 0.02.28 The constant K is chosen such that in the baseline 
equilibrium, the predicted wage in Nijmegen equals the observed average disposable 
household income.  
 
3.2 Simulation results 
 
Figure 5 shows land rents in the residential sector prior to and after the redevelopment project 
for the baseline scenario, where the urban fringe is held constant. The change in these land 
rents reflects the change in developer surplus. In the project area itself, extending to one 
kilometre from the CBD, any rents of land in alternative use should be subtracted. Rents of 
residential land close to the industrial site rise substantially, because of removal of the 
nuisance. However, land rents further away fall because of downward sloping demand, which 
turns out to dominate the agglomeration effect. Finally, note the slight dip in land rents near 
the boundary between the residential and the redeveloped industrial land, which is a 
consequence of fixing lot sizes in the existing city: these lot sizes would have been optimal in 
the presence of nuisance but after its removal they are too large. Lot sizes and consumption of 
the composite commodity that corresponds to this figure are documented in Appendix Figures 
A1 and A2 respectively.  
 Table 3 shows the benefits and costs of the project as obtained in Table 1 for the 
baseline project, as well as for two projects that are smaller and larger by a factor four. The 
number of additional households in the city equals 4814 in the baseline project and internal 
benefits amount to almost 17 million euros annually, corresponding to a present value of 330 
million euros at a discount rate of 5%. The external benefit of removing a nuisance to 
surrounding residents, based on the estimates from De Vor and De Groot (2011), constitutes 
10% of these internal benefits and external agglomeration benefits are worth another 15%. 
Hence, total benefits are substantially larger than what an owner of the site would consider in 
her investment decision. The benefit to new consumers is negligible compared to the internal 
                                                 
28
 In an applied general equilibrium analysis of US county-level employment, Chatterjee (2006) also chooses a 
scale-elasticity of 0.02, following essentially the same line of reasoning. This study illustrates that such a 
seemingly small elasticity can still have a substantial impact on the spatial distribution of jobs. Table 5 contains a 
sensitivity analysis with regard to this elasticity.  
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benefits, yet there is a substantial transfer from landowners to consumers who lived in the city 
already prior to the project. 
 
 The internal benefits, the agglomeration benefits and the transfer rise more or less 
proportionally with the size of the redeveloped site. However, the relative importance of 
removing the nuisance declines. The reason is that this effect is only external to the extent that 
it crosses the boundary of the industrial site, whereas within this boundary it is fully 
internalised in land rents. For a larger (circular) site, the area within is larger compared to the 
area at the fringe, so the owner will take a larger share of the nuisance into account. The 
inframarginal surplus rises more than proportionally with the size of the project, since new 
households have an ever lower taste for living in the city. For the largest project in Table 3, 
this benefit is almost as large as the benefit of removing the nuisance.  
 Table 4 investigates the impact of the demand elasticity on costs and benefits and it is 
based on the alternative estimate of the nuisance effect from Rouwendal and Van der Straaten 
(2008). Comparison of the second column of this table with the second column of Table 3, 
which has the same demand elasticity, shows that the external effect due to removal of the 
nuisance is almost equally large for both specifications. It should be borne in mind, though, 
that the magnitude of this benefit critically depends on the nature and magnitude of the 
environmental externality, which may vary considerably across brownfield sites.  
 A comparison of results across columns in Table 4 sheds light on the relative 
importance of general equilibrium effects. Recall that the case of perfectly elastic housing 
demand in the third column corresponds to the open city case, in which brownfield conversion 
does not induce a general equilibrium effect through reduced housing demand in the rest of 
the urban area. Direct benefits decrease when housing demand is more inelastic. The rise in 
inframarginal surplus, which will not be internalized by the owner of a brownfield site, offsets 
roughly half of this loss. Furthermore, the transfer from landowners to households may 
become quite substantial. Agglomeration benefits rise slightly with the demand elasticity, 
while the nuisance effect does not depend on it at all.  
 The impact of the strength of agglomeration economies is illustrated in Table 5. This 
table indicates that agglomeration benefits rise proportionally with the scale elasticity and it 
also identifies a minor positive impact on internal benefits. Table 6 contains a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the elasticity of substitution. A higher willingness to substitute the 
composite commodity, which may include the services from housing capital, for land implies 
a steeper urban density gradient. Hence, the density of housing on the centrally located 
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redeveloped site is larger if the substitution elasticity is higher. This explains the higher direct 
benefits, agglomeration benefits, inframarginal surplus and transfer.  
 Table 7 shows how the value of preserved open space, the final term in equation (15), 
depends on key model parameters. The demand elasticity varies over columns in a similar 
way as in Table 4. Agglomeration externalities are assumed to be absent in the upper panel 
while the scale elasticity equals 0.02 in the lower panel, just as in the baseline model. Within 
each panel, we vary the value of open space V while holding the development tax τ constant. 
Consider the upper panel first. With a demand elasticity of -2, redevelopment of a brownfield 
site of about 100 hectares preserves an area of open space at the urban fringe of about 50 
hectares. The resulting benefit is negligible if its value is fully internalized through land use 
policy at the urban fringe. If the value of open space is twice as high as the development tax 
(V – τ = 5), then the additional benefit rises to about 15% of the internal benefits. The amount 
of open space that is preserved and the benefit this generates fall with the demand elasticity. 
In the limiting case of infinitely elastic demand, the redevelopment project does not reduce 
development at the urban fringe at all.  
 The presence of agglomeration externalities renders development at the urban fringe 
more attractive, which is partly reflected in the price of land at newly developed sites. Hence, 
with a demand elasticity of -2 and a scale elasticity of 0.02, redevelopment of the same 
brownfield site of about 100 hectares now preserves an area of open space of only about 30 
hectares. If demand is sufficiently elastic, then the project may even increase development at 
the urban fringe – about 120 hectares in the case of an infinite elasticity. This yields additional 
costs rather than benefits if planning policies at the fringe are not capable of internalizing the 
value of open space. As documented in Appendix Table A1, which provides a complete 
overview of the costs and benefits that correspond to the lower panel of Table 6, 
agglomeration benefits are also affected by adjustment of the urban fringe. Preservation of 
open space means that fewer households enter the city so that the rise in productivity is lower 
than in a scenario in which it is held exogenous. In contrast, the extension of the urban fringe 
that occurs if demand is sufficiently elastic leads to higher agglomeration benefits. Hence, it 
may even be desirable to impose a development tax below the value of open space, since its 
loss is compensated by a productivity gain.  
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4 Conclusions and discussion 
 
This paper proposes a tractable urban general equilibrium framework for the evaluation of 
direct and indirect benefits of brownfield redevelopment. A numerical application explores 
the order of magnitude of effects under alternative parameter assumptions. We find that 
brownfield redevelopment may yield substantial external benefits through the exploitation of 
urban agglomeration economies and the removal of a nuisance. Hence, owners of brownfield 
sites would underinvest in such projects and government intervention may be warranted. The 
preservation of open space does not appear to be a relevant consideration from a welfare 
economic point of view, unless governments are unable to internalize the value of open space 
directly through planning policies at the urban fringe and the demand for housing in the city is 
sufficiently inelastic.29 With elastic demand, development pressure at the urban fringe may 
even increase because of agglomeration economies. Downward sloping demand for housing 
units in the city leads to several other general equilibrium effects. In the first place, 
brownfield redevelopment induces a transfer from landowners to households, which may be 
quite substantial. In the second place, there is a modest loss in direct benefits that is partly 
offset by a gain in inframarginal consumer surplus.  
 A caveat on the additionality of external agglomeration benefits is that we focus 
exclusively on welfare in the city in which the brownfield redevelopment occurs. There may 
be an offsetting loss in external agglomeration economies in the cities from which the 
incoming households originate. In that case, the enhanced exploitation of agglomeration 
economies should not be counted in a BCA at the national level. However, this offsetting 
effect does not necessarily occur, since incoming households may also originate from the 
countryside, where agglomeration economies are largely absent, or come at the expense of 
fewer rather than smaller cities. The underlying mechanisms are the same as in Vermeulen 
(2011), which studies the external agglomeration benefits of relaxing urban growth controls in 
a system of cities.  
 Our analytical framework is suitable for a range of applications. Instead of the 
redevelopment of an industrial site that is still in use, it may be applied to the cleanup and 
redevelopment of contaminated land, such as the US Superfund sites. In that case, the 
environmental quality function should reflect pollution or health risk, rather than nuisance. 
                                                 
29
 It is remarkable that EPA (2011) does not discuss the possibility that direct land use controls at the urban 
fringe internalize part of the external value of open space already. This may be due to the fact that such policies 
are less common in the US than in Europe. 
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Alternatively, this function could be made to reflect the urban blight that is often associated 
with vacant land (Wright, 1997). Of course, the magnitude of the external benefit that will be 
generated by the model will be driven by the empirical estimates of the environmental 
externality on which it is calibrated.30 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the 
benefits in our analytical framework are not comprehensive and may need to be augmented 
depending on the specific application.31   
 Finally, our results should not be interpreted as unqualified support for current 
government involvement in brownfield redevelopment and densification of land use in 
existing urban areas. Even if the value of redeveloped land underestimates social returns, 
these returns may still be surpassed by the costs of transformation projects. Moreover, the 
supply of redevelopable land is likely upward sloping, so a strong commitment to 
densification will lead planners to consider increasingly more expensive sites. Well-informed 
policymaking will require a careful and empirically founded analysis of the costs and benefits 
of each particular redevelopment project.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Benefits and costs of the redevelopment project 
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Table 2: Parameters 
Description of parameter Value 
Utility  
α preference parameter composite good 0.998515 
β preference parameter land 0.001485 
σ elasticity of substitution 0.5 
v0
* equilibrium common utility level  19287.3 
u reservation utility level  20039.6 
N total number of households in the city prior to the project 80,000 
I number of households in the Netherlands 7 million 
γ parameter of the Pareto distribution  0.675156 
   
Environmental externality  
η1 parameters of logistic decay function for proximity to 
industrial sites from De Vor and De Groot (2011) 
9.168764 
η2 -1.717655 
η3 0.012687 
η4 -1.49752 
δ semi-elasticity of house prices with respect to (minus) the 
share of surrounding land within 500 meter in industrial use 
from Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008) 
0.006 
   
Urban form  
ra boundary of brownfield area 1 km 
rb outer city boundary 4504.61 m 
ω share of land in development 0.33 
L total surface of residential area prior to project 2000 ha 
t annual commuting costs per meter 0.45 €/m 
ρ share of house price spent on land 25% 
C annualized price of agricultural land plus conversion costs 4 €/m2 
V external value of agricultural land as open space 5 €/m2 
   
Production  
w annual wage 26,000 
κ scale elasticity 0.02 
K constant in production function 20744.9 
Note: Information on the number of households and residential land use in Nijmegen is obtained from Statistics 
Netherlands and information on the average household income in Nijmegen is obtained from its municipal 
government. Commuting costs and the conversion and opportunity costs of agricultural land are based on 
Vermeulen (2011), the external value corresponds to the smaller cities in the sample of that paper. 
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Table 3: BCA for baseline, small and large project 
 small project baseline project large project 
 ra
 
 = 0.5 km ra  = 1 km ra  = 2 km 
Internal effects    
Benefits 4.30 16.54 61.73 
Costs 0.26 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 4.15 P + Q 
    
External benefits    
Removal of nuisance 0.98 1.59 2.67 
Agglomeration benefit 0.63 2.43 8.80 
Inframarginal surplus 0.01 0.19 2.23 
    
Transfers    
To old households 1.72 6.37 20.06 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2011). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
 
Table 4: BCA for alternative environmental externality and demand elasticities 
 demand elasticity demand elasticity demand elasticity 
 εD = -1 εD = -2 (baseline) εD = -∞ 
Internal effects    
Benefits 16.16 16.54 16.95 
Costs 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 
    
External benefits    
Removal of nuisance 1.86 1.86 1.86 
Agglomeration benefit 2.40 2.43 2.47 
Inframarginal surplus 0.38 0.19 0 
    
Transfers    
To old households 12.53 6.36 0 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on 
Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
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Table 5: BCA for baseline and alternative scale elasticities 
 scale elasticity scale elasticity scale elasticity 
 κ = 0 κ = 0.01 κ = 0.03 
Internal effects    
Benefits 16.39 16.46 16.61 
Costs 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 
    
External benefits    
Removal of nuisance 1.59 1.59 1.59 
Agglomeration benefit 0 1.21 3.66 
Inframarginal surplus 0.19 0.19 0.20 
    
Transfers    
To old households 6.34 6.35 6.38 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2011). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
 
Table 6: BCA for baseline and alternative elasticities of substitution 
 elasticity of 
substitution 
elasticity of 
substitution 
elasticity of 
substitution 
 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 
Internal effects    
Benefits 16.42 16.54 16.66 
Costs 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 
    
External benefits    
Removal of nuisance 1.60 1.59 1.58 
Agglomeration benefit 2.26 2.43 2.63 
Inframarginal surplus 0.17 0.19 0.23 
    
Transfers    
To old households 5.94 6.37 6.85 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2011). The urban fringe is exogenous.  
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Table 7: Value of preserved open space 
 demand elasticity demand elasticity demand elasticity 
 εD = -1 εD = -2 (baseline) εD = -∞ 
κ = 0    
V – τ = 0 0.15 0.07 0 
V – τ = 1 0.85 0.54 0 
V – τ = 2 1.55 1.02 0 
V – τ = 5 3.64 2.44 0 
κ = 0.02    
V – τ = 0 0.12 0.03 0.12 
V – τ = 1 0.73 0.33 -1.08 
V – τ = 2 1.34 0.63 -2.28 
V – τ = 5 3.16 1.52 -5.88 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2011).   
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Urban housing market
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Figure 2: Urban labour market
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1: Extended BCA for Table 6, lower panel (κ = 0.02) 
 demand elasticity demand elasticity demand elasticity 
 εD = -1 εD = -2 (baseline) εD = -∞ 
Internal effects    
Benefits 16.43 16.59 17.07 
Costs 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 1.04 P + Q 
    
External benefits    
Removal of nuisance 1.59 1.59 1.59 
Agglomeration benefit 1.33 1.91 4.56 
Inframarginal surplus 0.12 0.12 0 
Preserved open space    
     V – τ = 0 0.12 0.03 0.12 
     V – τ = 1 0.73 0.33 -1.08 
     V – τ = 2 1.34 0.63 -2.28 
     V – τ = 5 3.16 1.52 -5.88 
    
Transfers    
To old households 7.07 5.03 0 
Note: Amounts are measured in millions of euros per year. The environmental externality is based on De Vor 
and De Groot (2011). The urban fringe is endogenous.  
 32 
APPENDIX FIGURES 
 
Figure A1: Lot sizes
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Figure A2: Consumption of composite commodity
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